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Abstract
Spanning network games, which are a generalization ofminimum cost spanning
tree games, were introduced by Granot and Maschler(1991), who showed that these
games are always monotonic. In this paper a subclass of apanning network gamea
ia introduced, namely simplex gamea, and it ia ahown that every monotonic game
is a aimplex game. Hence, the clase of spanning network games coincides with the
c]ass of monotonic gamea.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory often models classes of `interactive situations', where this term
may have different interpretations. In such cases, it is important to identify the class
of the mathematical models, namcly the cla.ss of games that corresponds to the class of
interactive situations. For example, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) modeled the
class of `interactive situations' that fall under the category of strategic form games in
an environmenL of transferable utility and full and unrestricted cooperation as a clavs of
TU-cooperative games. They proved (in both directions) that the corresponding games
constitute precisely the class of superadditive TU-games. Borm and Tijs (1992) showed
that the class of strategic form games in a non-transferable utility setting where playera
are allowed to coordinate their actiona corresponds to the class of superadditive NTU-
cooperative games that satisfy the requirement of standardness. As another example,
the class of weighted majority constant sum games was identified iu 1'eleg (1968) as a
class of simple TU-games satisfying certain Bondareva-Shapley conditiona. The class of
exchange economies in a transferable utility environment, for example, was modeled and
identified in Shapley and Shuóik (1969) as the class of totally balanced games. Kalai
and Zemel (1982) showed that the class of flows with private ownership correaponds to
the class of non-negative totally balanced games. Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989) showed
that the class of flows, where the ares ate controlled by coalitions with veto playera
corresponds to the class of non-negative balanced games. Such identiócation is not al-
ways complete. For example, Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) showed that bankruptcy
situations give rise to non-negative convex games, but they also showed that not every
non-negative convex game can be derived from a bankruptcy situation.
One reason why such identification is important is, becauae it enables one to decide
whether a certain solution concept is appropriate to the corresponding situation. For
example, ii t.he interactive situations correspond to the class of simple games, then it
makes uo sense to rc~comrnend the Shapley value on the basis of Shaplcy's (1953) original
axioms, because the sum of simple games, which appears in one of the axioms, is not a
simple game and therefore the system is not meaningful when restricted to that class.
In fact, Dubey (1975) showed that another set of axioms, which dces make sense in the
restricted class of simple games, is sufficient to characterize the Shapley value. Now, if
one wants to recommend and justify a solution for a class of interactive situations that
corresponds to the class of simple games, one can refer to Dubey's axioms and check if3
- they are appealing in the actual case under consideration.
The present paper is concerned with the identification of the class of TU-games that
correspond to a class of spanning network enterprises. This class (see section 2) was
defined by Granot and Maschler (1991) and it generalizes Megiddo's (1978) apanning
tree and the more general Granot and Huberman (1981) monotonic minimal spanning
network enterprises. Granot and Maschler (1991) prove that the games that result from
these enterprises are monotonic. Here we shall, in reply to a question that was raised
by Pradeep Dubey, prove that the converse is also true: for every monotonic TU-game
(N, v), there is a spanning network enterprise whose game is (N, v).
In section 2 we formally introduce the model of a spanning network enterprise and its
correspouding spanning ne~twork gamc. hurt.her, somc properticw of spanning network
games are investigated in this section. In section 3 a subclass of spanning network games,
the cla.4s of so-called simplex games, is introduced and our main result is proved, namely
that every monotonic game is a simplex game.
2 Spanning network games
A spanning network enterprise is a structure S :- (V, E, a, 6, N), where (V, E) is a fi-
nite undirected graph containing a distinguished vertex, 0, called the root or the central
supplier. We assume that the graph (V, E) is connected. Further, a is a function from
E to R that associates with each edge e E E a cost a(e), and b is a[unction from V to
R associating with each vertex v E V a cost 6(v). Note that both a and b can also as-
sign negative values, in which case they represent profits rather than costs. In addition,
N- { l, ..., n} is a set of players. Each player is located in a vertex V. Vertices, other
than the root, that are not inhabited by players will be called switch óoxes. Note that
we do not exclude the possibility that several players are located in the same vertex,
neither did we exclude the possibility that the root is inhabited.
The players are users of some good that can be provided by the central supplier.
Ilcncc, the playcrs in a r.ualitiun S C N want to build a nctwork that ronnects them
to the root. Moreover, they want to do this in a cheapest possible way. Now, it is
important to note that players are only located in vertices, they do not own them and4
cannot prevent other players from using the vertices they inhabit. Further, the players
in S may find it profitable to build edges and vertices that they do not need for the
actual connection to the root. They are allowed to do this. However, we do require
that the network that is built by a coalition is connected. Correspondingly, for every
coalition S C N the cost c(S) is defined to be the cost of a least expensive connected
subnetwork of (V, E) that connects all players in S to the root. Here, the cost of a
subnetwork G' -(V', E') is w(G') -~„Ey~ b(v) f~~EE~ a(e). Now, we defined a cost
game I'S - (N, c) associated with a spanning network enterprise S. The game I'S is
called (the corresponding) spanning network game.
There is somewhat of a problem with the empty set of players. Should we require
the empty coalition to pay the cost of the root? In this paper we will do so and we also
allow the empty coalition to build profitable edges and vertices that aze connected to
the root. Note that this is consistent with the way we handle other coalitions. Further,
it implies that for a spanning network game I'S - (N,c) it is not necessarily true that
c(0) equals zero. However, defining c(0) to equal zero for every spanning network game
would not change the results in this paper.
Example 1. Let N-{1,2,3} and consider the network that is represented in figure 1,
where the root is denoted by a triangle p and switch boxes are denoted by a square O,
and where we omitted the costs that equal zero.
03
Figure 1
Then the cost for the empty coalition is c(0) - 3- 1- 2.
Further, an optimal subnetwork for the coalition {2} is
-3,5
Figure 2
Hence, for the spanning network game (N, c) associated with this network
c({2}) - 3- 1 t 5- 3- 4. The game ( N, c) is given in table 1.
S 0 {1} {2} {3} {],2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
c(S) 2 4 4 5 6 7 5 7
Table 1
Now suppose in example 1 we lower the cost of the root by 2. Hence, the cost of
the root are now 1 and all other costs are unchanged. Some calculation shows that
the spanning network game (N,ca) corresponding to this new situation is related to the
game (N, c) in the following way: for each S C N it holds that co(S) - c(S) - 2. So, in
particular, co(0) - 0. This is a property that holds in general:
Remark 1. For every spanning network enterprise S and its associated game I'S -(N, c)
we can define a slightly different enterprise So by lowering the cost of the root by c(0) and
the game I'So -(N, ca) associated with this new enterpriae satisfies co(S) - c(S) - c(0)
for all S C N, so especially, ca(0) - 0(this is a special instance of "Network Equiva-
lence~ as defined by Granot and Maschler (1991)).
Spanning network games are monotonic, i.e.
c(S) C c(T) for all S C T C N,6
as was shown by Granot and Maschler (1991).
The following theorem shows that if all costs in a spanning network enterprise are non-
negative, then the corresponding spanning network game is subadditive, i.e.
c(S UT) C c(S) f c(T) for all disjoint S,T C N.
Theorem 1. Let S- (V, E, a,b, N) be a spanning network enterprise with a~ 0 and
6~ 0. Then the spanning network game IS is subadditive.
Proof. Let TS -(N,c) and S,T C N such that S f1 T- 0. Suppose Gs -(ys Es)
is a subnetwork that is optimal for coalition S, i.e. Gs connects all players in S to the
root and w(Gs) - c(S), and let GT -(VT, ET) be an optimal subnetwork for coalition
7'. Considcr thc nctwork C:'~"T :- (V'~UVT, GsU I5T). '[his network obviously connccta
all players in S U T to the root. Further, since the root must be contained in both Vs
and VT, the network G~ is also connected. What is cost of the network Cs`~?
The inclusion-exclusion principle implies
w(CsuT)
- ~ ~v) t ~ a(e)
vEVSUVT eEESUET
- ~ b(v) ~ ~ b(v) - ~ b(v) f ~ a(e) f ~ a(e) - ~ a(e)
vEVs vEVT vEVSnVT eEEs eEET eEESnET
- w(Gs) t w(GT )- ~ 6(v) - ~ a(e)
vEVSnVT eEESnET
~ w(Gs) } w(GT)- c(S) f c(T),
where the inequality follows from the fact that both a~ 0 and b~ 0.
This shows that the coalition S U T has to spend no more than c(S) -}- c(T) to build
a connected subnetwork that connects the players of this walition to the root. Hence,
c(S u T) C c(S) -F c(T). O
The following example shows that spanning nctwork games are not in general subaddi-
tive.7
Example 2. Let N-{ 1, 2} and consider the network that is represented in figure 3.
Figure 3
The spanning network game (N,c) associated with this network satisfies
c({1}) - c({2}) - 0 and c(N) - 1. This game is not subadditive.
3 Simplex games
In this section we show that every monotonic transferable utility game is a spanning
network game. In fact, we construct for each n E N a so called simplex network, that
is shown to generate all monotonic games with player set {1,...,n} juat by adapting
the costs of the vertices. Note that it suffices to consider monotonic games (N, c) with
c(0) - 0, because if we can find for each monotonic game (N, c) with c(0) - 0, a span-
ning network enterprise S~N,~I with corresponding spanning network game (N, c), then
by remark ] we can find for a monotonic game (N, é), with possibly é(0) ~ 0, a spanning
nctwork entcrprise geuerating this game by adding é((~) to the cost o( the root in the
spanning network enterprise S~N,,.~, where c'(,S) - c(S) - è(0) for all S C N.
In the following, let n E N be fixed and N:- {1,...,n}. By es, S C N, we denote
the vector in {0,1 }N that satisfies es - 1 p i E S. The simplex network ON -(Vrr, EN)
is constructed as follows. The central supplier is identified with the origin, the vertex 0,
and player i is identified with the vertex e', i E N. Further, for each non-empty coalition
S C N there is a vertex ds, the door for coalition S. For {i} C N this door is the vertex
ze', and for S C N with ~S~ ? 2 this door is the vertex ~es, the center of gravity of
the vertices e' with i E S. Finally, there is a reward vertex R, which is the vertex eN.
All edges in the simplex network are incident to a door ds: for every non-empty S C N8
door ds is directly connected to the central supplier 0, to the reward vertex R, and to
all e' with i E S.
'I'ho simplcx nct.work for n- 3 is sketched in fiRum 4. In this figum the edqes rnnnecting
the doors d' to the central supplier are oí the form -.- and the edges connecting the
doors ds to the vertic~ e' with i E.S are of the form ---. In order to get a clear picture
the edges betwcrn the doors ds and Lhc reward vertex are all omitted and, morcover, the
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We proceed by providing for every game (N, c) with c(0) - 0, a set of costs attached
to the vertices of the simplex network ON. Here we will use for a game (N, c) a measure9
of non-subadditivity of (N, c), a(c) E Rt, which is defined by
k `1 11
a(c) :- maX 0,
SCN:Sj~7 (T~.....T.)EP(S) ~(e(S) -~ e(Ti))(k - 1)-'I
J'
where for S C N, Y(S) denotes the set of all partitions of S in at least two (non-empty)
subcoalitions. Note that a(c) - 0 for subadditive games (N, c).
Now let ( N,c) with c(0) - 0, be fixed. We define all edges in the simplex network
ON to be costless, as well as the vertices corresponding to the central supplier and the
single players. Further, for every coalition S, S~ 0, the cost of the vertex ds, the door
for coalition S, is c(S) f a(c), and to the reward vertex R we assign the cost -a(c) (the
reward a(c)). Now we have the followíng
Theorem 2. Let (N, c) be a monotonic game with c(0) - 0. Then the simplex network
~N with costs as described above, generates the game (N, c).
Proof. Let S C N, S~ 0. We have to prove two things, namely that there is a subnet-
work of ON that is feasible for S and has cost c(S), and that every subnetwork of ~N
which is feasible for S costs at least c(S).
Obviously, the subnetwork of ~N that is spanned by the central supplier, the door ds,
the vertices e' with i E S, and the reward vertex, is a feasible network for coalition S.
The cost of this network is c(S) -F a(c) ~(-a(c)) - c(S).
Suppose G-(V, E) is another subnetwork of ON that is feasible for coalition S. Then
this network has to contain the central supplier and the vertices e' for each i E S. More-
over, the network has to be connected. Since for each i E N the vertex e' is only directly
connected to the doors dT with i E T C N, the fact that G is connected implies that
for every i E S there is a door dT contained in G with i E T; C N. It is possible that
we find the same door for different i. Hence, we can find k E{1,...,~5~} and differ-
ent T~ ,..., Tk C N satisfying S C ~J~-~ T~ such that G contains the doora dT' ,... dT4.
Using monotonicity of (N, c), it is clear that for all noa-empty 1' C N it óolda that
c(T) -F a(c) 1 c(0) f a(c) - a(c) 1 0. Since the reward vertex is the only vertex having
a non-positive cost (-a(c)), we may without loss of generality assume that R belongs
to C and hcnce, thc cost w(G) of the network G is at leastlo
k k
-o`(c) f~Íc(Ti) f a(c)) -(k - 1) a(c) f~ c(T;).
i-r i-r
(1)
We distinguish two cases.
If k- 1, then S C Tl must hold. Hence, by (1) and monotonicity of (N, c) it follows that
w(G) ? c(1'~) ? c(S).
If k 1 1, then we can find sets T„ Tz, ... Tk such that T~ C Ti for all j E{I ,. .., k} and,
moreover, {T~ ~ j E{ 1, ... , k}, T~ ~ 0} forms a partition of S. One way to do this is




Now it follows from (1) and the monotonicity of (N, c) that
k k
w(G) ~~ c(T;) t(k - I) a(c) 1 ~ c(T~) -h (k - 1) a(c).
i-~ i-r
From the definition of a(c) we derive that
k
~r(r~ 7 r(.S) -- ~r(T~) ( k ~)-~.
~-1
Combining (2) aud (3) shows that
(2)
w(G) ~ c(S).11
This completes the proof o[ the theorem. O
A direct consequence of theorem 2 is
Corollary 3. The class of monotonic games coincides with the class of spanning network
games.
Also, using the fact that a(c) - 0 for subadditive games (N, c) with c(g) - 0, we derive
from theorem 2.
Corollary 4. For every monotonic subadditive game (N,c) with c(0) - 0 there is a
xpanning not.wurk i~ntcrprixi, S -(V,lz,u,L,N) with u~ 0 auJ G~ 0 sn~~6 Lhat Lhi~
associated spanning network game IS equals (N, c).12
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